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The problem of understanding the conditions under which cooperation or altruism
can be sustained between interacting selfish entities is a fundamental issue in both
biology and the social sciences.
In recent years, there has been an explosion of work utilising agent-based com-
puter simulation to explore novel mechanisms for cooperation. This surge was prob-
ably kick-started by the famous “computer tournaments” and related work of Robert
Axelrod (1984). Predating this, of course, there is a large body of mathematical game
theoretic analysis following in the tradition established by von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1944). Historically, this latter approach has tended towards unrealistically
strong assumptions concerning the rationality and knowledge of actors. More re-
cently, refinements have addressed systems with slightly less strong assumptions.
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Axelrod looked to biologists, such as Maynard Smith (1982), who had applied
evolution to strategies of game interactions between animals. In this approach, strate-
gies were generally simple heuristics, requiring no rationality or common knowledge,
selected by evolution where “utility” is interpreted as “fitness”. Axelrod’s interpre-
tation was, however, not one of biological evolution but social or cultural evolution.
The idea is that those strategies that perform better will tend to be imitated by others
and hence spread in the population.
Much of the earlier work in this area assumed all agents in a population mixed
randomly—so called “mean field” mixing—meaning that any agent could interact
with any other over time. The more recent trend has been to study the effect of agents
embedded within social or topological structures that limit and mediate their interac-
tions. These structures may be static or may evolve themselves based on interactions
between agents.
These kinds of models and results are becoming increasingly relevant for distrib-
uted computer systems design. A recent trend in information systems is the emer-
gence of massive and decentralised open systems in which potentially selfish com-
ponents need to cooperate to achieve their goals. For example, consider the recent
popularity of peer-to-peer (P2P) applications over the Internet. Many of these kinds
of systems need to self-organise without central control or global information (so
as to be robust against interference, for example). Hence, simple heuristics that pro-
mote cooperation are potentially very desirable. As a case in point, the currently most
popular P2P system, called BitTorrent,1 uses a cooperation protocol inspired by the
“tit-for-tat” strategy popularised by Axelrod’s computer tournaments. It is for these
reasons that computer scientists, and particularly distributed systems researchers, are
becoming interested in basic cooperation theory and novel mechanisms that facilitate
such cooperation.
This special issue is the result of a workshop held over two days (May 27–28) in
2006 at the University of Bologna conference centre in Bertinoro, Italy. The work-
shop brought together social scientists and computer scientists working on novel co-
operation mechanisms from around the world. After the workshop, ten papers were
submitted, including an invited paper, for this special issue. From these five papers
were selected.
All of the selected papers focus on some aspect of social structure, either static or
dynamic, relating how those structures influence cooperation between simple agents
playing simple interaction games.
Shutters (2008) presents a thorough analysis of simulations where agents play the
ultimatum game on different spatial topologies, with and without punishment sanc-
tions. Edmonds et al. (2008) survey some recent models that produce cooperation
through dynamic social structures including tag-based cooperation and evolving net-
works. Rossi et al. (2008) apply a simple evolving network model to agents playing
the “weakest link” game where there is a set of increasing, socially efficient equi-
libria. They show that the evolving structure selects robustly for socially optimal
outcomes. Mollona and Marcozzi (2008) present and compare a set of models of task
allocation for firms in a knowledge-based economy. Interestingly these models were
1http://www.bittorrent.com.
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derived partially from proposed P2P protocols. Nikoletseas et al. (2008), in an invited
paper, present a detailed analysis of a “hawks and doves” game over a graph show-
ing how topology affects the survivability of strategies in the long-run. We feel that
these papers collectively show the promise and progress in this area. We look with
anticipation for their further development.
Finally, we would like to thank all those who attend the Bertinoro workshop and
who submitted papers for this special issue. We also owe a great debt to the anony-
mous reviewers who conscientiously read and commented on the submitted papers
and suggested improvements to the authors. We would like to thank the sponsors of
the workshop.2 Without their financial support the workshop would not have been
possible.
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